





EFFECTS OF MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP AND 
PROFITABILITY ON COMPANY VALUE 
MEDIATED BY DEBT POLICY AS INTERVENING 
VARIABLE 
(A Study on Manufacturing Companies Listed on 
Indonesia Stock Exchange Period 2011-2015) 
 
Giantoro Pamungkas 




This study aims to determine whether there are effects between managerial 
ownership and profitability on company value, by using debt policy as 
intervening variable. The type of research used was descriptive and associative 
research. The research population was manufacturing companies listed in 
IDX period of 2011-2015 as many as 80 companies. By using purposive 
sampling method, 25 companies as sample were obtained. The data used was 
secondary data. Data analysis used classical assumption test, path analysis 
and partial test (t-test), using SPSS (Statistics Product and Service Solution) 
17 for windows. The results indicate that there are no effects of managerial 
ownership on company value, there are positive and significant effects of 
profitability on company value, there are no effects of debt policy on company 
value, there are positive and significant effects of managerial ownership on 
debt policy, there are negative but not significant effects of profitability on 
debt policy, there are no effect of managerial ownership on company value 
with Debt Policy mediated, there are negative effects of profitability on 
company value with Debt Policy mediated. 











In Indonesia, throughout 2011-2013, Indonesia Stock 
Exchange has issued sixteen companies from the exchange and 
seven of them are manufacturing companies. IDX removes the 
listing of the listed company shares if it has encountered at  least 
one condition or event listed, which significantly negatively 
effects the business continuity of listed company as open 
company. Obstacles that cause problems in the manufacturing 
sector may effect the company value.  
The ups and downs of stock prices in the capital market 
become an interesting phenomenon because it is related to the 
issue of the rise and fall of the company value itself 
(Ovtchinnikov, 2009). The global economic crisis in 2008 effected 
Indonesian capital market, as a result many domestic investors 
were busy to release their shares. The condition essentially effects 
the company value. In addition, the other effects of company 
value are the reduced investor confidence, threatened 
sustainability of capital and investors, disruption of funding 
needs for investment, disruption of investor capital and 
bankruptcy. Many factors can effect the rise and fall of company 
value, one of them is managerial ownership. Under agency 
theory, there is a conflict between managers and shareholders 
(Cornett, 2003). 
Based on the background that has been described above, 
the following research questions can be formulated as follows: 
1. Does managerial ownership effect company value? 
2. Does profitability effect company value? 
3. Does debt policy effect company value? 
4. Does managerial ownership effect debt policy? 










Agency Theory was proposed by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Agency relation is a contract between one or more 
persons (principal) who employs another person (agent) to 
provide a service and then delegate authority decision making to 
the agent. Under this approach, funding policies are structured 
in ways to reduce conflict between different interest groups. 
Pecking Order Theory was first introduced by Donaldson 
(1961), while the naming of pecking order theory was by Myers 
(1984). Here, the company prefers the use fund from internal 
capital, a fund that comes from cash flow, earning is retained 
and depreciated. Pecking order theory is a policy taken by a 
company to seek additional funds by selling assets owned, such 
as selling buildings, land, equipment, and other assets including 
with retained earnings.
Trade-Off Theory is another name for balancing theory. 
The concept of trade off theory balances the benefits and costs of 
using debt in the capital structure (Brigham et al, 1999). This 
theory was introduced by Modigliani and Miler (1958).  
 
Company Value 
Company value is the perception of investors to the 
success rate of company that is often associated with stock prices 
(Sujoko and Soebiantoro, 2007 in Hermuningsih, 2013). Bringham 
& Daves (2004) states that nothing more important to a new 
business than raising capital. Management then can set up an 
optimal capital structure that can raise the company value 
(Modugu, 2013). 
The company value can basically be measured through 
several measuring instruments such as, PBV, Tobin's-Q, EPS, 
PER, BVS. But in this study, we use PBV (Price to Book Value) 
which is widely used in various analyzes of world securities.  
PBV is the comparison between the stock price and the 
book value per share (Brigham and Gapenski, 2006). 







Managerial ownership has long become the attention in 
corporate governance literature since the mid-70s, while the idea 
of managerial ownership was present since the Baltics regained 
their independence (A., Berke-Berga et al, 2017) Managerial 
ownership shows the percentage of ordinary shares held by the 
management actively involved in the company decision making. 
With the shares ownership by the insiders, the insiders will 
also get benefit directly on decisions taken (McConnell, 2008). 
The total managerial shares it self is the number of ordinary 
shares owned by directors and commissioners of companies that 
allocate part of their welfare for the company. On the other hand, 
the number of outstanding shares is the outstanding shares in the 
community that reflects the company ownership. 
 
Profitability 
According to Chen & Hammes (2004) in Modugu (2013), 
profitability indicates how efficiently management utilizes its 
total assets in order to generate earnings. Profitability ratios 
measures earning capacity of the firm, and it is considered as an 
indicator for its growth, success and control. (Kabajeh, et al., 
2012). A positive ROA indicates that the total assets used for the 
company's operations are able to provide profit for the company. 
In contrast, a negative ROA indicates that the total asset used by 
the company is loss Kabajeh, 2012). 
 
Debt Policy 
Debt Policy can basically be measured through DER. DER is 
a debt policy decision that refers to the choice of companies on 
the composition of debt and equity. DER advantage is able to 
illustrate the risk of the portion of the debt and equity level that 
the company has. By using DER measurement, the amount of 






Low DER may reduce the risk of bankruptcy and financial 
difficulties. High DER shows the total composition of the larger 
debt so that the company's expenses to outsiders (creditor) will 
be greater. For a company, the amount of debt should not exceed 
its own capital so that the fixed burden is not too high. The best 
ratio is if the total capital is greater than total debt or at least on 
the same amount. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Effects of Managerial Ownership on Company Value 
Agency theory by Jensen and Mackling (1976) describes that 
managers with high managerial ownership tend to have 
information about the financial performance of a better company 
that can increase the company value because the interests of 
managers not only on the interests of the contract but also 
ownership. Research by Mc Connel, et. al. (2008) states that 
insider ownership can be used to increase company value up to 
certain point, but then additional ownership can reduce the 
company value. Based on the above description, the research 
hypothesis 1 formulated is as follows: H1: Managerial ownership 
positively effects the company value. 
 
Effects of Profitability on Company value 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) reveal that company value is 
determined by the earnings of the company asset power. The 
positive effect of earnings power asset on company value shows 
that the higher earnings power the more efficient the asset 
turnover and the higher profit margin obtained by the company, 
so it increases the company value (Tugas, 2012). The empirical 
relationship of profitability on company value has been 
investigated by Chen and Chen (2011) research, where 
profitability has positive effects on company value. Based on the 
above description, the research hypothesis 2 formulated is as 






follows: H2: Profitability provide positive effect on the company 
value. 
 
Effects of Debt Policy on Company value 
Trade off explains if the target capital structure has been 
achieved then any additional debt will lower the company value 
(Shahar, 2015). It shows that if the position of capital structure is 
above the optimal point then any additional debt will reduce the 
company value and the use of excessive debt can bring the 
company closer to bankruptcy. Based on the above description, 
the research hypothesis 3 formulated is as follows: H3: Debt 
policy provide negative effects on company value. 
 
Effects of Managerial Ownership on Debt Policy 
Agency theory in Jensen and Meckling (1976) states that if 
managerial ownership and debt policy act mutually in the 
agency's oversight mechanism, then there is a negative causality. 
That is, a big role of managers as shareholders in making 
decisions shall be bear carefully in using debt. In this case, the 
percentage of managerial ownership in the company is so small 
that it cannot determine debt policy. Based on the above 
description, the research hypothesis 5 formulated is as follows: 
H4: Managerial ownership provide negative effect on debt 
policy. 
 
Effects of Profitability on Debt Policy 
Pecking order theory used by Myers (1984) explains that 
profitable companies generally borrow fewer loans, because they 
require little external financing. Therefore, the level of debt in a 
profitable company will be lower. So there is a negative 
relationship between profitability and debt policy. A study by 
Bringham et al. (1999) it explains that companies with high rates 
of return on investment use relatively small debt. High returns 






internal funding sources. Based on the above description, the 
research hypothesis 5 formulated is as follows: H5: Profitability 
provide negative effect on debt policy.    




Type of research 
The type of research used in this research was descriptive 
and associative research. This study used associative research 
used to explain, predict, and control a phenomenon. 
 
Population and Sample 
Population used in this study was manufacturing 
companies listed in IDX 2011-2015, with a total of 141 companies 
consist of several industrial sectors. (www.idx.co.id). The 
research sample was 16 manufacturing companies in 2011-2015 
periods. Companies as the sample are shown in Table 3.2 as 
follows: 
Table 1. Company Sample 
No Company Name Code 
1 PT Berlina Tbk  BRNA 
2 PT Barito Pasific Tbk  BRPT 




Debt Policy Company  






No Company Name Code 
4 PT Pan Asia Indosyntec Tbk HDTX
5 PT Intan Wijaya International Tbk  INCI 
6 PT Jakarta Kyoei Steel Work LTD Tbk  JKSW 
7 PT Jaya Peri Steel Tbk  JPRS 
8 PT Kertas Basuki Rachmat Indonesia Tbk  KBRI 
9 PT Krakatau Steel Tbk  KRAS 
10 PT Langgeng Makmur Industry Tbk  LMPI 
11 PT Mulia Industrindo Tbk  MLIA 
12 PT Pelat Timah Nusantara Tbk  NIKL 
13 PT Sat Nusa Persada Tbk  PTSN 
14 PT Sunson Textile Manufacturer Tbk  SSTM 
15 PT Sumalindo Lestari Jaya Tbk  SULI 
16 PT Tembaga Mulia Semanan Tbk  TBMS 
(Source: Indonesia Stock Exchange www.idx.co.id) 
 
Operational Variable 
Operational variables are the translation of certain variables 
that arise in a study into a more detailed indicator.  
Summary of operational definition of research variables can 
be seen in table 3.3 as follows: 
Table 2. Operational Definition of Variables 




The ratio used to determine 
how much common shares 
owned by directors and 
commissioners in the role 
as owner and shareholders. 













Variable Concept Measurement Skala 
Profitability 
(ROA) 
ROA indicates a company 
ability to use all its assets to 
generate profit after tax. 
This ratio is important for 
the management to 
evaluate the effectiveness 
and efficiency of 
management in managing 
all the company assets. 





Debt Policy  
(DER) 
This ratio shows the 
proportion of own capital 
to finance its debt. The 
higher this ratio the greater 
the risk faced. (Source: 
Sartono, 2001: 121). 
Total Debt 




The company value 
through its price to book 
value is determined by 
comparing the stock price 
and the book value per 
share. Therefore, PBV cis 
the result of the comparison 
between the stock market 
price and price to book 
value (Brigham and 
Gapenski, 2006) 
Market Price per 
Share  














In this study, inferential analysis was used to test the effect 
of managerial ownership, profitability and debt policy on 
company value. Researchers used a quantitative approach with 
parametric statistical tests. The statistical tests used consist of: 
 
Classic Assumption Test 
Normality Test  
To test whether the regression model, nuisance or residual 
variables have a normal distribution. Heteroscedasticity test 
aimed to test whether in the regression model there is a variance 
inequality of the residual one observation to another observation. 
Multicollinearity test aimed to test whether the regression model 
provides correlation between independent variables 
(independent). A good regression model should not be correlated 
between independent variables. Autocorrelation test aimed to 
test whether in linear regression model there was a correlation 
between the confounding errors in period t with the intruder 
error in period t-1 (previous).  
 
Path Analysis 
To test the effect of intervening variable, we used path 
analysis method. Path analysis was an extension of multiple 
linear regression analysis or path analysis. Sobel test was 
conducted by testing the indirect effect of independent variable 
(X) to the dependent variable (Y) through the intervening 
variable (Z). The variable Z is called a mediator or intervening if 






effected Z, and the Z equation significantly effected Y by 
controlling X. 
The effect of mediation shown by path analysis was tested 
by Sobel Test with the following formula:  
 
Source: (Ghozali, 2011:255). 
Description: 
p2 : direct effect on intervening variable 
p3 : direct effect of intervening variable on dependent variable 
Sp2 : Standard Error Xi on intervening variable 
Sp3 : Standard Error of intervening variable on dependent variable 
 
 Therefore, to test the significance of indirect effect we 
needed to calculate the t value of  p2p3 coefficient with the 




RESEARCH RESULT  
The results of the study that begins with the classical 
assumption test produce some decisions as presented below: 
Classic Assumption Test 
The data normality test used Kolmoorov-Smirnov Test 
presents 2.426 results but with asym values. Sig = 0.000 is lower 
than the specified level of significance that is 0.05. These results 
do not meet the classical assumption requirements that require 
Sp2p3 = 222222 3.23.22.3 SpSpSppSpp  
 






the value of asym.sig> 0.05. Therefore, the provision of normal 
data distribution is not met. 
 
Table 3. Result of Normality Test kolmogorov-smirnov  













0.708 0.698 Normal 
Distribution 
 
The result of normality test on kolmogorov-smirnov value 
Sub Structure 1 and 2 respectively produces kolmogorov-
smirnov value of 0.908 and 0.708 with significance value (Asymp 
Sig. 2-tailed) from normality test of 0.381 and 0.698. The figure is 
above 0.05. Therefore, the provision of normal distribution data 
has been fulfilled. 
 
Table 4. Result of Multicollinearity Test Value  
Sub Structure 1 and 2 
No Description Tolerance VIF Analysis Results 
1 Sub 
Structure 1
   
 - LN_INSDR 0.796 1.257 no multicollinearity 
 - LN_ROA 0.796 1.257 no multicollinearity 
2 Sub 
Structure 2
   






 - LN_ROA 0.751 1.332 no multicollinearity 
 - LN_DER 0.691 1.448 no multicollinearity 
 The multicollinearity test produces Tolerance value for 
structure 1 and 2, each produces Tolerance value> 0.10 and VIF 
<10. Therefore, the model, either in structure 1 or structure 2 
multicollinearity does not occur among independent variables in 
the regression model.  
 
Table 5. Result of Heteroscedasticity Test Value  
Sub Structure 1 and 2 
No Description Sig Analysis Results 
1 Sub Struktur 
1 
  
 - LN_INSDR 0.364 no heteroscedasticity 
 - LN_ROA 0.311 no heteroscedasticity 
2 Sub Struktur 
2 
  
 - LN_INSDR 0.880 no heteroscedasticity 
 - LN_ROA 0.738 no heteroscedasticity 
 - LN_DER 0.104 no heteroscedasticity 
 
Heteroscedasticity Test Result shows that it is statistically 
significant with the value of > 0,05 so it can be said free from 










Table 6. Result of Auto Correlation Test Sub value  






2.047 no autocorrelation 
2 Sub 
Structure 2 
1.975 no autocorrelation 
 
From the Auto Correlation Test Results by using Durbin-
Watson yield Durbin-Watson value, it can be concluded that it 
cannot reject H0 which states that there is no positive or negative 
autocorrelation (it can be concluded there is no autocorrelation) 
 
Table 7. Result of Linearity Test Value Sub Structure 1 and 2 
No Description Sig  Analysis Results 
1 Sub 
Structure 1 
0,099 linear regression model
2 Sub 
Structure 2 
0,801 linear regression model 
 





















t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .553 .406  1.362 .184 
LN_INSDR 2.674 1.080 .419 2.475 .019 
LN_ROA -.260 .185 -.239 -1.411 .169 
a. Dependent Variable: LN_DER 
To measure the in structure 1 we have to determine the R square value. 
Table 9. Line Value Sub Structure 1 
Model Summary
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .563a .317 .270 1.33704 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LN_ROA, 
LN_INSDR 
Based on the above table then R square (R²) of 0.317 was 
obtained to test the path value in structure 1 using )1( 2R  
formula that produced 0.948. Therefore, the coefficient value ( 1) 
of profitability variable path on the debt policy is 0.948. The 
following is a Path Analysis Diagram Substructure 1:  















From the Path Analysis Diagram Substructure 1 equation 
of: Z = 0.553 + 2.674  0.260 + 0.948 was obtained. 
Based on the analysis of path analysis diagram 
 is 2.674, 
meaning that 1% increase of managerial ownership will be 
followed by the increase of debt policy by 267.4%. Negative path 
-0.260, it means any decrease of 
profitability by 1% will be followed by decrease of debt policy 
equal to 26.0%. 
 







t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -.470 .200 -2.346 .026 
LN_INSDR .690 .569 .246 1.213 .235 
LN_ROA .225 .091 .469 2.464 .020 
LN_DER .120 .089 .273 1.353 .187 
a. Dependent Variable: LN_PBV
Managerial Ownership 
Profitability (X2) 









To measure the in structure 2, R square value must be 
determined as follows:
 







Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .470a .221 .137 .63969 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LN_DER, 
LN_ROA, LN_INSDR 
Based on the above table, to obtain R square (R²) of 0.221 to test 
the path value in structure 1, we used the formula )1( 2R  that 
produced 0.975. Then, the coefficient value ( 1) profitability variable 
path on debt policy is 0.975. The following Path Analysis Diagram 
Substructure 2 is as follows: 






From the picture diagram of substructure path analysis 2 
we get the equation:Y = -0.470 + 0.690 + 0.225 +  0.120 + 0,975 
 
Based on the analysis of substructure path 2, the value of 
YX1) is 0,690, meaning that 1% increase of 
managerial ownership will be followed by the increase of 
pYZ = 0.120 
Managerial 
Profitability 










company value equal to 69,0%. The value of the path coefficient 
will be followed by a 22.5% increase in company value. The 
debt policy increase will be followed by the increase of the 
company value by 12.0%. 
Based on the path diagram coefficient above the path 
analysis is obtained as follows: 










The diagram explicitly describes the causality relationship 
between the variables shown by the arrows. Each p value 
represents the path and path coefficients. The direct effect and 
indirect effect can be seen in the following equation: 
 
Effect of managerial ownership on Company value: 
Direct effect  = 0.690 
Indirect effect  = 2.674 x 0.120 = 0.321 




















From the calculation results, it can be concluded that there 
are direct effects of managerial ownership on company value 
because the multiplication result of indirect effect is smaller than 
the direct effect, that is 0.321 <0.690, with the total effect of 1.011. 
Based on the calculation of direct and indirect effects, it shows 
that Debt Policy is unable to mediate the effect of managerial 
ownership on company value.  
 
Effect of profitability on Company value: 
Direct effect  = 0,225 
Indirect effect  = -0.260 x 0.120 = -0,031 
Total effect  = 0.225 + (-0.031) = 0,194 
 
From the calculation above, it can be concluded there is a 
direct effect of profitability on company value because the result 
of multiplication of indirect effect is smaller than direct effect, 
that is -0.031 <0.225, with total amount of effect is 0,194. Based 
on the calculation of direct effect and indirect effect, it indicates 
that the variable Debt Policy is not able to mediate the effect of 
profitability on the company value. This is because, the value of 
profitability in the company is high enough so that it provides 
effect on the increase of company value. 
 
Detecting Mediation Effect (Sobel Test) 
To test the effect of intervening variable, we used path 
analysis method (Path Analysis). The use of path analysis in this 
study was to determine the direct and indirect effects 
simultaneously or independently on each variable as the 
researchers want to compare the various paths. 
 






Effect of Managerial Ownership on Company Value Mediated 
by Debt Policy  
The result of path analysis to test the managerial 
ownership on company value through Debt Policy was tested 
using Sobel test.








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .553 .406  1.362 .184 
LN_INSDR 2.674 1.080 .419 2.475 .019 
LN_ROA -.260 .185 -.239 -1.411 .169 
a. Dependent Variable: LN_DER 
 
 








t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 






LN_INSDR .690 .569 .246 1.213 .235 
LN_ROA .225 .091 .469 2.464 .020 
LN_DER .120 .089 .273 1.353 .187 
a. Dependent Variable: LN_PBV 
The model of indirect effect, namely the effect of 
managerial ownership on the company value through debt 
policy is as follows:  






Sp2 = 1,080 
Sp3 = 0,089 
Mediations effect that shown by path analysis will be test 
uses Sobel Test, with the formula is as follows: 
Sp2p3 = 222222 3.23.22.3 SpSpSppSpp  
Sp2p3 = )089,0.080,1()089,0.674,2()080,1.120,0( 222222  
Sp2p3 = )008,0).(166,1()008,0).(150,7()166,1).(014,0(  
Sp2p3 = 083,0  Sp2p3 = 0,288 
effect statistic uses following formula : 
P2 2,674 P3 0,120 
P1 0,690 
Debt Policy (Z) 
Managerial Ownership Company Value 













p2p3  = 2,674 x 0,120   = 0,321 
Then obtained tcount : 
t = 
288,0
321,0  = 1,116 
The result of examination of the effect of managerial 
ownership on company value with Debt Policy mediated shows 
the result of t-count obtained 1.116 and t-table 1,96 then 1,116 
<1,96, hence alternative hypothesis (Ha) rejected and accept null 
hypothesis (H0) meaning partially no effect of ownership 
managerial value of companies with mediated Debt Policy.  
DISCUSSION 
Effects of Managerial Ownership on Company value  
Results of the study show that there is no effect of 
managerial ownership on Company value in Manufacture 
Company in 2011-2015 Period listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. This result is inconsistent with Agency Theory, which is 
urged by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a conflict between 
manager (agent) and shareholder (principal) so that it creates 
agency cost. In Badjuri Jensen and Meckling (1976) one of the 
solutions to reduce agency cost is increasing the shareholding by 
management. This situation will force the manager to bear the 
risk if they make a wrong decision. A huge managerial 
ownership amount is incapable of aligning management and 






value cannot be achieved. Managers have interest that tends to 
comply with the achievement of overall corporate objective 
(Munns, 1996). 
Effects of profitability on company value  
Results of the study show that there is a significant and 
positive effect of profitability on Manufacture Company in 2011-
2015 Period listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. This result is 
consistent with signaling theory that states a good-quality 
company will send a signal to the market purposely in order to 
make differentiation between good-quality and bad-quality 
company. To make the signal effectively accepted, the market 
must catch and translate it into good perception, and avoid an 
imitation by bad-quality company (Megginson, 1987). This result 
gives an indication that more-profitable prospect company will 
avoid stock selling and try to get new capital by other steps, 
including the use of debt that excess a normal capital structure 
target. Otherwise, less-profitable prospect company will tend to 
sell the stock, that means they will try to find a new investor to 
share their loss. Share issue announcement is a signal that 
company offers a new share selling more frequent than it used to 
means gives a negative signal that c
even for bright prospect company (Haugen, 1996). 
Effects of Debt Policy on Company Value  
Results of the study show that there is no effect of debt 
policy on Company value in Manufacture Company in 2011-
2015 Period listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. This does not 
support the hypothesis (rejected). This theory also explains if a 






capital structure target is achieved by company then every debt 
mount on 
equity, does not give any implication in Company value amount. 
If there is no effect of debt policy on Company value it indicates 
that whether debt cost or equity cost are relatively equivalent 
and each has its advantage and disadvantage. This situation 
explains that if capital structure position is higher than optimal 
spot then each debt addition will decrease Company value and 
excessive debt use will bring a company into bankruptcy 
(Modugu, 2013). 
Effects of Managerial Ownership on Debt Policy  
Results of the study show that there is a significant and 
positive effect of managerial ownership on debt policy in 
Manufacture Company in 2011-2015 Period listed in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. This does not support the hypothesis (Rejected). 
This result is inconsistent with Agency theory, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). However, this result is consistent with 
gives effect yet it does not give significant effect on debt policy, 
Agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976). If managerial 
ownership and debt policy are substituting each other in agency 
problem overseeing mechanism, then it appears negative 
shareholder will make more effective way in use a debt. This 
result indicates that managerial ownership can align manager's 
position with shareholder to act in line with the shareholder 
desires. The implication is, investor can make 
ownership structure as an investment consideration. Debt policy 






be considered because creditor control benefit will be reduced 
due to a new conflict between shareholder and creditor. So high 
ore, debt 
(Croce, 2014). In addition, dividend policy can also be used to 
reduce agency conflict. 
Effects of Profitability on Debt Policy  
Results of the study show that there is insignificant 
negative effect of profitability on debt policy in Manufacture 
Company in 2011-2015 Period listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. This supports the hypothesis (accepted). This result is 
consistent with pecking order theory that explains the reason 
behind a profitable company loan a debt in low amount, due to a 
low external financing, therefore, it will make a lower amount of 
debt level in profitable company, then it can be concluded there 
is a negative relationship between profitability and debt policy. 
Yet this result is not supported by and Bringham et al. (1999) 
stating that a high-return company upon investment uses a low 
debt. A high return allows financing a huge amount of fund uses 
internal source. The implication for a sector in obtaining fund 
through debt enable shareholder to maintain control of share 
with limited investment, creditor see equity, or paid-in fund by 
owner, to provide a safety margin, so that if shareholder gives 
only a fraction of the total financing, then the company's risk is 
largely on the creditor and if a company receives a larger return 
on investment financed by loaned fund than interest payment, 
return on owner's capital will be greater.  
 






Effects of Managerial Ownership on Company Value 
Mediated by Debt Policy 
Results of the study show that there is no effect of 
managerial ownership on Company value mediated by Debt 
Policy. This is inconsistent with Agency theory, Jensen and 
Mackling (1976) in (Vintila and Gherghina, 2014), stating that a 
high-managerial ownership manager tends to have a better 
but also ownership. Non-monotonic relationship appears due to 
 to align interest with 
outsider ownership by increasing their shareholding if Company 
value is increasing. The implication is the higher managerial 
ownership the lower debt policy used by a company so that it 
reduces Company value. Debt policy as intervening variable is 
not able to mediate because by entering variable of debt policy it 
will decrease Company value. 
Effects of Profitability on Company Value Mediated by Debt 
Policy  
Results of the study show that there is a negative effect of 
profitability on Company value mediated by Debt Policy in 
Manufacture Company in 2011-2015 Period listed in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. This result is consistent with Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) stating that Company value is determined by 
company earnings power asset. Earn  positive 
effect indicates that the higher earnings power, the more efficient 
an asset turnover and the higher a profit margin obtained by the 
company so that it will give effect on Company value increasing. 






discovering that a profitability gives a positive effect on 
profitability; the company prefers to finance uses internal 
used by a company (Salawu, 2009), therefore, it can decrease 
Company value. Debt policy as intervening variable is not able 
aning that it 
decreases Company value. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the data and analysis above, the conclusions are 
as follows: 
1. There is no effect of managerial ownership on Company value 
in Manufacture Company in 2011-2015 Period listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange, so that the results meet 
ownership is incapable of aligning management and 
value will be loss. The manager tends to fulfill their own 
 
2. There is a positive and significant of probability on Company 
value in Manufacture Company in 2011-2015 Period listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. This result indicates that a good-
profit company will avoid stock selling and try to get new 
capital by other steps, including the use of debt that excess a 
normal capital structure target. Otherwise, less-profitable 
prospect company will tend to sell the stock, meaning that 
they will try to find a new investor to share their loss. Share 






issue announcement is a signal that management views 
new share selling more frequent than it used to be, it will 
ecreases since issues a new stock means 
for bright prospect company. 
3. There is no effect of debt policy on Company value in 
Manufacture Company in 2011-2015 Period listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. This result shows that if capital 
debt addition will decrease Company value and excessive 
debt use will bring a company into bankruptcy. Therefore, 
there is a negative relationship between debt policy and 
Company value. 
4. There is a significant and positive effect of managerial 
ownership on debt policy in Manufacture Company in 2011-
2015 Period listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. This result 
indicates that managerial owners
position with the shareholder to act in line with the 
. The implication is that, investor can 
consideration. Debt policy can be used to reduce agency 
conflict, but the debt level should be considered because 
conflict between shareholder and creditor. So, the high level 
 consideration in investment. 







5. There is insignificant negative effect of profitability on debt 
policy in Manufacture Company in 2011-2015 Period listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. The implication for a sector in 
obtaining fund through debt enable shareholder to maintain 
control of share with limited investment, creditor see equity, 
or paid-in fund by owner, to provide a safety margin, so that 
if shareholder gives only a fraction of the total financing, then 
the company's risk is largely on the creditor and if a company 
receives a larger return on investment finance by loaned fund 
than interest payment, return on owner's capital will be 
greater. 
6. Results of the study show that there is no effect of managerial 
ownership on Company value mediated by Debt Policy.    
The implication is the higher managerial ownership the 
lower debt policy used by a company so that it reduces 
Company value. Debt policy as intervening variable is not 
able to mediate because by entering variable of debt policy it 
will decrease Company value.  
7. There is a negative effect of profitability on Company value 
mediated by Debt Policy in Manufacture Company in 2011-
2015 Period listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. The 
company prefers to finance uses internal capital. The higher 
profitability the lower debt policy used by a company so that 
it can decrease Company value. Debt policy as intervening 
variable means decrease company value.  
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